Abstract. Th e article deals with semiosis and its dimensions as a theoretical construct to show some elementary diff erences between spheres of semiotic activity. In essence, one sign will be dissected into four categories of existence to show it may have diff erent relations depending on the dimension it happens to be in. Th e general framework is that of human consciousness and its two distinct states: awake cognition and asleep dreaming with emphasis on the latter. From our point of view, the concepts of 'nature' and 'culture' have two layers: the manifest form and the latent function, the seen and the unseen. Th ese are used as parallels to support the central thesis of this article that human cognition has dreaming as its countepart.
Introduction
"Semiosis is that operation which, by setting up a relationship of reciprocal presupposition between the expression form and the content form -or the signifi er and signifi ed -produces signs. [...] By semiosis can also be meant the semic category of which two constituent terms are the expression form and the content form (or, signifi er and signifi ed) ." (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 285) Semiosis produces signs, enabling the generation of meaning. Th is says very little, and oft en enough semiosis is treated either as a (thought) process or as a function in nature and/or culture; the inevitable outcomes of which -meanings -are the sole part known to the interpretant in an infi nite series of interpretata 1 . Th is is the case in the sphere of consciousness in a state facilitating a suitable structure for cognitive mentation to "take place", and therefore I will not touch the subject of semiosis from any other viewpoint. Also, sign-function is excluded from the fi rst half of this paper in order to delve into the four most elementary spaces known to us for potential semioses. In order to taper towards a single semiostasis, its diff erent dimensions, and to exclude the systematicity or infi nite continuance of semiosis, I adopt Pyatigorskij's view in that semiotics, instead of emphasizing the 'sign-system' or the 'sign, ' should rather concentrate on 'sign-ness' as its central concept:
But sign-ness is not the PRIMARY (or ELEMENTARY) concept of semiotics since it is the abstraction of a particular QUALITY, namely, to formulate it in the most general terms, the abstraction of THE QUALITY OF BEING A SIGN, or, in a more expanded formulation, of SOMETHING'S QUALITY OF BEING A SIGN OF SOMETHING FOR SOMEONE IN SOME PLACE. Th e semantic aspect of the problem is expressed in the words 'to be a sign of something' , the pragmatic by 'to be a sign for someone' , the communicative by 'to be a sign somewhere' . (Th e syntactic aspect is not expressed here, since the concept 'sign system' is not being considered.) (Piatigorsky 1974: 185 [emphasis original]) Th e hypothesis of this paper depends on the well-recognized fact that intra-and interspecifi c boundaries as well as the boundaries of more abstract and/or concrete semiotic spaces can never be experientially transgressed, penetrated into and comprehended in their totality. Depending on the semiotic subject's modalities and competence with regard to the meaning(s) of a given sign, "the relations [...] are of a radically diff erent eidetic type in the logical and the semiotic universes" (Petitot 2004: 210) . Th at is, 'sign-ness' in human umwelten is not necessarily 'sign-ness' in nature 1 "Th ey are called "interpretata" since they are dealt with in the process of interpretation, and it is to them that the semiosis ultimately relates, although they are oft en "absent" or inaccessible to direct perception. However, interpretata can also be imagined objects, such as "unicorns", which are only remotely connected to objects existing outside the organism" (Krampen 1997: 250). or other semiotic spaces and vice versa 2 . Hence, for one sign there must be diff erent dimensions of semiosis. Disregarding the syntactic aspect, i.e. sign function and theorizing about a single sign by dissecting it onto four categories of existence, each will be shown to have its own peculiar semiosic modes or conditions for 'sign-ness' . Th us my aim is to make a point why certain boundaries remain unbreachable.
The fourfold dimension of Representamen, (non-)Object and (non-)Interpretant
Th e semiotic square is suitable for establishing a preliminary typology of relations necessary "to distinguish intrinsic features, those which constitute the category, from those that are foreign to it" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 308) with regard to major semiosic dimensions. As can be noticed, Pyatigorskij's defi nition of 'sign-ness' echoes Peirce's defi nition of a sign: "[A] sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity" (CP 2.228). In addition to this similarity, the triadic sign at its simplest defi nition is commonplace in semiotics, and its elementsrepresentamen (R), object (O) and interpretant (I) -are used also in this article. In general, 'object' is anything we can think or talk about. It pays to notice that objects do not need to be physical and that the lack of an object would deprive the sign of its being a sign, i.e. representamen, at all: "it is a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without. Th at for which it stands is called its object; that which it conveys, its meaning; and the idea to which it gives rise its interpretant" (CP 1.339).
Signs -according to semiotics -are very real and responsible for reality itself; they make their way so that "the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretation again" (CP 1.339). Th e infamous infi nite series created in this fashion is halted via "ontologization" of the semiotic square thus aff ording semiosistasis and hence, on the axis of sub-contraries, instead of calling (Ī) non-interpretant and (Ō) non-object which would be in accordance with the inner logic and terminology of the semiotic square, we designate (Ī) to point to the absence of interpretation under will and (Ō) to the absence of knowledge of objects, though at times the prefi x 'non-' is used. However unorthodox, the triadic sign is projected onto the semiotic square.
Th e diagram ( Fig. 1) is an adaptation of the semiotic square as presented by Greimas and Courtés (1982: 309) . In the diagram, representamen (R), or 'sign-ness' is placed in the middle for the following reasons:
2 Th e semiotic/psychoanalytic tradition of dream analysis and dream interpretation is not discussed here. It is not the aim of this paper to say this or that of the formation or interpreted meaning of dreams but only of the possible forms of sign as such in four dimensions.
(i) we, and according to us all other beings, have no access to anything without it being (an interpretation of) a representation, i.e. a sign, and; (ii) by extension this argument applies both to nature and culture.
Th e fi rst point concerns the elementary proposition of (anthropo-)semiotics and the minimal requirement for something to be interpreted or function as a sign. Here, however, there is no function. Th e representamen and its constituents irrespective of the dimension discussed are treated as static. Th e second point is that the use of the same mark for representamen (R) and 'sign-ness' is applicable in all aspects. Th e relations, albeit iconically depicted with dissimilar placement of the arrows from those of the original, remain the same as the ones shown on the diagram's legend. Th ere are, however, some alterations. First of all, this is not "the visual representation of the logical articulation of any semantic category" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 308) nor exactly does it concern "the elementary structure of signifi cation, when defi ned [...] as a relation between at least two terms [which] rests only on a distinction of opposition which characterizes the paradigmatic axis of language" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 308) . Th e latter defi nition is somewhat closer to what is being done here; to distinguish 'dimensions' of semiosis as understood by human cognition, i.e. the elementary mechanisms and functional principles of distinct semiotic spaces where we consider signs to be the elements that enable activity. Th is adaptation also strives to off er a supplementation for semiosis as an elementary axiological 3 structure by example of the triadic sign in order to prepare ground for possible future elaborations of abstract categories of value. Th ough excluded at fi rst, it may be noted that as a term semiosis is "synonymous with semiotic function" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 285) .
On the axis of contraries, object (O) and interpretant (I) are in oppositionwere it possible to distinguish a single semiosis in actuality, then strictly speaking the interpretant could never be the object. However, they are both presupposed and "can be present concomitantly [...] they are said to enter into a relation of reciprocal presupposition or which comes to the same thing, a relation of contrariety" (Greimas, Courtes 1982: 309) . In other words, were there no (representations of) objects, the interpretations (of representations) would not exist either, although in cases their categorial positions are interchangeable.
Including from the middle representamen (R) we fi nd the traditional triad 'R-O-I' forming a sign, i.e. the utmost minimal requirement for constituting (conscious, cognitive) semiosis in the human mind. In our world of awake, there are at least two categories of objects -the physically real and the imaginary interpretata. Th at is, as animals we are endowed with senses that enable the perception of physical objects and as thinking beings we may indulge in musing on the imaginary, creating unicorns and like interpretata that are semiotic objects, albeit immaterial in their being. For a person to receive a representation of an object, s/he needs to be awake (A) for interpretation (I). "In order that an interpretant might emerge, it must enter into interaction with some interpreter" (merrell 2013: 28) . Th at is, were I unconscious, I would not know I (can) think. Th us, by incorporating the awake state (A) we end up with the quadruple 'R-O-I-A' , which may be said to be our basic dimension of acknowledged being, the existential whereabouts and semiotic elements by which I know 'I' am when awake.
On the positive deixis, there is in addition to the representamen (R), an object (O) but there is no interpretant (Ī) in the human sense. As one may infer, the semiotic dimension of the positive deixis is that of nature (N). Th e lack of freedom for abstract endowment of meaning and/or arbitrary interpretation in nature is based on Uexküll's (1982: 28) claim that "because no animal ever plays the role of an observer, one may assert that they never enter into relationships with neutral objects. " Th is is adopted to apply to all of nature; it is only in the human semiotic that "[Th rough] every relationship the neutral object is transformed into a meaning-carrier, the meaning of which is imprinted upon it by a subject" (Uexküll 1982: 28) . It may be said that in nature, the objects' relations to subjects are limited by their physical being -there are no immaterial or imaginary objects, no abstract interpretata in nature.
Th is is not to say that nature (N) would totally lack interpretations, but that it is considerably narrower and more restricted when it comes to creating new information in this way. Or rather, it is slow to happen within aeons unobservable for the human intellect. Allowing this, it may be said that the quadruple 'R-O-Ī-N' forms the semiotic dimension of beasts and organic matter, including our bodies. It must be noted, however, that cultured nature, i.e. biotic and organic matter submitted to human will such as fi elds of genetically enhanced crops, cloned livestock and the like, will not be considered here, no matter whether they belong to nature or not.
On the negative deixis, we fi nd as proper only interpretation (I) of representation (R) but no object (Ō). Th is is based on the presumption that culture (C) -whether seen as a semiospheric phenomenon of a mnemonic mechanism or as any other terminological construct -cannot with certainty be said to be conscious of its (physical) self through senses in order to receive information via or from objects, but only their representations interpreted: "Th e history of culture is refl ected as an evolution of interpreting cultureon one side by its contemporary auditorium, on the other by next generations, including the scientifi c tradition of interpretation" (Lotman 1999: 39; my translation, H. T.) .
Culture is to itself simultaneously a subject and an object, neither of which overlaps with the other in a single semiosis. For the sake of the argument, physical objects with regard to 'sign-ness' in culture are treated as elements that from the point of view of culture "are not bearers of meaning, as it were do not exist. Th e fact of their actual existence recedes to the background in face of their irrelevance in the given modelling system. Th ough existing, they as it were cease to exist in the system of culture" (Lotman 1990: 58) .
Excluding the overlapping boundaries and the typology of culture for the sake of convenience, culture's elementary functional mechanism can be said to be interpreting itself through representations (of non-objects) within itself, constituting the semiotic dimension of culture 'R-Ō-I-C'; a supra-individual monad of its own rank.
On the axis of subcontraries, there is no object (Ō) nor an interpretant (Ī) proper but only a representation (R) in and of a physically unreal dimension -dream (Z) 4 . Discussing dreams, Lotman (2009) claims that "the moment a temporary space (the pause) between impulse and reaction appeared represented a turning point in the history of consciousness" and that this new state of being "requires the development and improvement of memory" which, in its turn brought forth "the transformation of the reaction to an immediate action into a sign" thus shift ing the orientation to reaction from the basic biological schema 'stimulus -response' towards information, creating "an independent structure capable of assimilation into an ever more complex and self-developing mechanism" (Lotman 2009: 142) . Th at is, conscious being and what followed.
In general, dreaming is "an endogenously mediated perceptual experience occurring physiologically during sleep [...] in a format which the dreamer tends to experience as a participant rather than a mere observer" (Blom 2010: 157) . In other words, the Traumwelt 5 is a polylingual semiotic space which is immutable by conscious action due to nescience of existence 6 or, as mutable as mundane reality by will of thought. Th e dream "does not immerse us in visual, verbal, musical and other spaces but rather in the space of their coalescence which is analogous to real space" (Lotman 2009: 145) . Th en, duly in a dream, even more so than when awake, "the form of meaning articulates a substance which cannot be empirically observed" (Petitot 2004: 191) . Regardless, the dream becomes known -for us -in retrospect in the awake dimension where it intrudes as a memory of and in itself.
"We only know dreams from our memory of them aft er we are awake" (Freud 1965: 76) . Th rough recollection, despite the randomness and diff erent order of things than in the accustomed to awake surroundings, the 'I' of Traumwelt is still by force of circumstance exactly the same as the one you think you are best acquainted with daily, only existing in a diff erent reminiscential world than that of awake. "Any act of semiotic recognition must involve the separation of signifi cant elements from insignifi cant ones in surrounding reality" (Lotman 1990: 58) . Analogous to real space and consisting of "signs of who knew what, i.e. signs in their pure form" (Lotman 2009: 143) , dream may be said to form for us a second(ary) sphere of semiotic existence 'R-Ō-Ī-Z' in which we 4 Th ere are two reasons why the term dream is marked with (Z). Firstly, it is presumed that in a dream everything may represent something else and secondly, it is visually customary to use (Z) to point out that someone is sleeping which is the minimal requirement for dreaming proper.
Occasions of lucid dreaming -dreams in which one knows one is dreaming and can control one's behaviour and environment to an extent -are excluded here alongside hypnagogic/ hypnopompic hallucinations. are incapable of action and not aware that 'I' exists, or, to say the least, the 'am' of 'I' is diff erent due to diff erent surroundings in a diff erent setting experientially wholly as real.
Th us, we have at least four separate 7 semiosic dimensions for 'sign-ness' according to some very general principles and, as was proposed, the 'something's quality of being a sign of something for someone in some place' within each domain is unbreachable as the exact same sign from one dimension to the other due to the specifi c qualities of the dimensions. Th e four dimensions are, in essence:
that of awake (R-O-I-A), in which conscious (anthropo-) semiosis occurs; that of nature (R-O-Ī-N), in which organic (bio-) semiosis occurs; that of culture (R-Ō-I-C), in which inorganic (cultural) semiosis occurs; that of dream (R-Ō-Ī-Z), in which unaware (oneiric) semiosis occurs.
So far it has been presumed that the presence of elements of a given sign oscillates according to 'sign-ness' in each of the four dimensions. However, this is not the case in the strict sense -especially as regards the lack of interpretation in nature and lack of object in culture. It would be somewhat absurd to claim that the triadic sign would retain its 'sign-ness' or enable semiosis if crippled into a twopartite triadic sign. Indeed, if there were no interpretation in nature nor object in culture, evolution in both would be excluded. Hence for the sake of clarity, the sign so far has been treated as semiosistatic and the proposed lack is not an unconditional one but a purely theoretical one that serves to point to the dominant element of semiosis in each dimension. "Th e dominant may be defi ned as the focusing component [...] it rules, determines, and transforms the remaining components" (Jakobson 1981: 751) . More generally in tetralemmic terms, in nature the object either is or is not (affi rmation/negation) for a given subject, whereas in culture the object is and is not (equivalence); in dream the object neither is nor is not (neither) whereas awake the object's mode of being depends on the contextual situation of a given sign -a discussion which we will not enter here.
Moreover, it may be argued that nature (N) and culture (C) are in a relation of simple presupposition -the relation between the presupposing term and the presupposed term: "By presupposed term is understood that term, the presence of which is the necessary condition for the presence of the presupposing term, while the presence of the presupposing term is not the necessary condition for the presupposed term" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 243) . Chronologically speaking, culture (C) could not have evolved had there been no nature (N), whereas nature does not require the presence of culture (C) in order to exist.
On the other hand, awake (A) and dream (Z) are in a relation of reciprocal presupposition, both terms (or dimensions) being simultaneously presupposing and presupposed. Th e relation between them as states of consciousness and semioses therein is predominantly "either that of combination, on the syntagmatic axis, or that of opposition, on the paradigmatic axis" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 243) , emphasized according to the potential assortment of facilitatory forms of meaning or structures of consciousness.
In general it may be said that awake semiotic is more syntagmatic, causal and logical; dream semiotic is more paradigmatic, random and alogical. Alhough occasions of lucid dreaming and the like were excluded above, they may be mentioned here to point to the possibility of functional concomitance between dream (Z) and awake (A), i.e. the possibility of their co-presence in either state as parts manifest or latently lingering in the other aft er the transformation of one state into the other. Th at is, to an extent aware cognition may be present in a dream and unaware cognition in reality. Based on the subject's overall knowledge, an individual's umwelt and Lebenswelt form a Traumwelt of which we are aware, as well as of the other dimensions, only by default of our own peculiar semiotic mode. It must be noted that in addition to their separate natures, all four dimensions are embodied by the human essence; the body is of nature, mind of awake, the dream an intersection and culture an extension.
It is also worth noting that remembered dreams are sometimes puzzling and may show "an extraordinary persistence in memory" (Freud 1965: 76) . Suggestively speaking, a core phylogenetic function of this mnemonic translatory cycle may have been to bridge the gap between ens realis (body) and (pre-)archaic ens rationis (mind), sealing "the structure of the "I" [that] is one of the basic indices of culture" (Lotman 2009: 147) .
Being-able-to semiosis
From the point of view of conscious experience, semiosis is an unavoidable semiotic mechanism that as a function constitutes sign-action in human cognition and, according to some of them, it is responsible for things happening elsewhere as well. From the framework of a theory of modalities, the concept of "being-able (to do or to be)" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 23 ) is adopted here as an operational term in order to clarify the elementary functional natures of the above semiosic dimensions. Th is of course requires some clarifi cation and extrapolation of terms.
Modality -in general terms -is that which modifi es the predicate of an utterance 8 whereas modalization is "conceived as the production of a so-called modal utterance, 8 "[...] we understand utterance to mean any entity endowed with meaning, belonging either to spoken strings or to written texts, prior to any linguistic or logical analysis" (Greimas, which over-determines a descriptive utterance" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 193) . Not delving that much deeper into theory, it may be stated that the most elementary types of modal utterances are utterances of doing 9 or of state 10 . Th ey pertain to the dichotomy transmogrifi cation/pertuity and "can be found either in the syntactic description of descriptive utterances or in the hypertactic description of modal utterances" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 194) .
Producing signs, semiosis is an infi nite process of 'being' that "serves as copula in utterances of state" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 22) . Synonymous with semiotic function, semiosis is a doing between two states. Artifi cially frozen as an object of knowledge 'being' , both 'doing' and 'state' are applicable to semiosis, which as a whole can be treated as being-able. Th e term "being-able (to do or to be) can be considered as the name of one of the possible predicates of the modal utterance governing a descriptive utterance of doing or of state" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 23 ). As such, both possible predicates are elementary modal utterances defi nable by their respective transitive aims and by this "two modal structures of being-able are to be considered; the one comprises an utterance of state and is called for convenience's sake being-able-to-be; the other has for its object an utterance of doing: being-able-to-do" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 23) . Beingable-to-do can also be projected onto the semiotic square to bring it into accordance with the above dimensions (see Fig. 2 ).
being-able-to-do being-able-not-to-do (freedom) (independence)

not-being-able-not-to-do not-being-able-to-do (submission) (powerlessness).
Figure 2. Being-able-to-do projected onto the semiotic square (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 23).
Courtés 1982: 362). Here, utterance is adopted, so that its defi nition extends to the abstract category of semiosis as an entity.
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"As the predicate-function of such an utterance, doing is to be considered, in an anthropomorphic syntactic language, as the conversion of the transformation relation. " (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 93) 10 "Th e term state can be homologated with that of continuous" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 311) . According to Greimas and Courtés, "In semiotics, any entity is considered to be continuous prior to analysis [...] which, alone, permits the construction of discontinuous or discrete units" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 58) .
To complement the elementary functions of semiosis through being-able-to-do, the values of the modal categories as presented above along with the explicated signrelations in diff erent dimensions will be shown to defi ne the reach of semiosis as signfunction in each. In addition, (A) must at points be extended to the concept of 'alive' and 'light' , whereas (Z) must at points extend to the concept of 'dead' and 'dark' . Th is should not be a far-fetched metaphor.
In light of the above and general knowledge of semiotics, it may be said that what is received of a sign by a semiotic entity is its representamen (R). Granted, the way the semiotic square has been used so far, it remains a fi rst generation square regardless of the positioning of the dimensions being visually similar to the second generation of terms as in the original. Albeit omnipresent, the dimensions belong to diff erent semantic and overall semiotic categories. Strictly, (A) and (Z) are two main states of consciousness available and comprehensible to all, but, as is obvious, the majority of people are part nature (N) part culture (C) and so, however semiosis occurs in either or both, it is applicable to the human and its intellect in consciousness. Allowing this, I will now off er a terminological supplementation and by way of a 45 o tilt, an extended adaptation of the semiotic square as presented in Fig. 3 .
E g e i r o t h e t i c Freedom
Powerlessness
O n e i r o t h e t i c Submission
Independence 
Supplementation and adaptation
Th e four semiosic dimensions abstracted from the semiotic square require in part to be re-attached to fi t the tilted square of being-able-to-do. For clarity's sake, this will be done by introducing new terminology with regard to dimensions, their elementary mechanisms and functional principles. Unfortunately, only two basic functions will be provided: that of nature and that of culture. Th ese dimensions will be treated fi rst by dividing each into two before moving on to other propositions. First, the triangle formed by including representamen (R) on the axis of nature (N), non-interpretant (Ī) and sleep (Z) constitutes the functional principle of the natural world 'N-Z' , which is based on non-interpretations of (representations of) objects. It is void of conscious freedom of choice and all semiosis functions on an 'as-is' principle, leading nature to wherever she may evolve. Th e outcome of semioses unstressed by consciousness or volition may be called thesisaorist 11 . Th is is to emphasize the unstressed nature of semiosis in nature that is evident as the absence of interpretation as we understand it as well as to point to the fact that nature pre-dates all conscious being and is of undefi ned duration as such. By collocating this with the triangle formed by including representamen (R) on the axis of nature (N), object (O) and awake (A), where the phenomenal, living natural world 'N-A' resides and in which (bio-)semioses happen -within the object of nature without the possibility of interpreting itself as something else -the elementary semiotic mechanism can be said to be autophaneric 12 . Th is is to point to the 'automatic' , inner functioning of nature in the sense that growth of plants and animals -evolution -happens by and in itself as the biological functions happening inside each organism show; each body of organic matter grows old and dies like celestial bodies.
In short, thesisaorist semiosis is an unstressed function, there is no guiding thought or consciousness, and it takes place in the dimension of nature. Th e (unguided) function of thesisaorist semiosis is autophaneric in that as a mechanism it represents objects of itself to itself by itself and in itself, excluding conscious interpretation. From the 45 o tilted point of view of being-able-to-do, it may be argued that the functional potential of 'sign-ness' in thesisaorist autophaneric semioses is restricted according to the value of the modal category not-being-able-not-to-do, i.e. semiosis is in a position of submission due to the lack of free interpretation. Th at is, natural beings take their natural habitat as natural, where there is no need (or possibility) for grand change.
Second, the triangle formed by including representamen (R) on the axis of culture (C), interpretant (I) and awake (A) constitutes the phenomenal cultural world 'C-A' , the functional principle of which is based on interpretation alone and all semiosis functions on an 'is-as' principle, leading culture to wherever it may evolve. Th e outcome of semioses stressed by consciousness or volition (by way of humans) may be called Arsisaorist 13 . Th is to emphasize the stressed nature of semiosis in culture in the sense that everything in culture is artifi cial, objectivated matter carrying on interpretation but knowing no objects. Each object was, and has the potential to be, something else, hence there is no need to know them, only their interpretations. It also points to the pre-dating and indefi nite duration of culture, albeit from a species-specifi c human point of view. Everybody is born into a culture. By collocating this with the triangle formed by including representamen (R) on the axis of culture (C), non-object (Ō) and sleep (Z), there lay the elementary semiotic mechanism of culture, 'C-Z' . Cultural semioses happen within culture without the knowledge of objects, distorting interpretations indefi nitely, and can be said to be sciautomatic 14 . As the reasons for absence of knowledge of objects indicate: culture is immaterial and inanimate matter, it may be said to function as deaf, dumb, and blind automatically without senses, facilitating only interpretation of meaning.
In short, arsisaorist semiosis is a stressed function, there is a guiding thought derived from consciousness (regardless that signs and/or interpretations of objects may take on a 'life' of their own, they have been instigated by someone) and it takes place in the dimension of culture. Th e (guided) function of arsisaorist semiosis is a sciautomatic mechanism in that it interprets representations of itself to itself by itself and in itself, excluding objects; unaware of what it consists of. From the 45 o tilted point of view of being-able-to-do, it may be argued that the functional potential of 'sign-ness' in arsisaorist sciautomatic semioses is restricted according to the value of the modal category being-able-not-to-do, i.e. semiosis is in a position of independence due to the lack of objects, which in themselves are not essential to their being. Th at is, if culture adopts a new interpretation, it discards the object and the process of interpretation cannot be shut down by any means.
13 Arsis + aorist; from arsis (prosody): a stressed syllable or part of a metrical foot in Greek or Latin verse; from aorist (grammar): relating to or denoting a past tense of a verb (especially in Greek), which does not contain any reference to duration or completion of the action. 14 Scia + automatic; from Greek skia ('shadow'); from Greek automatos ('acting by itself ').
To put it in an ideational manner: thesisaorist autophaneric semiosis corresponds to randmoness, light, rebirth and continuity, whereas arsisaorist sciautomatic semiosis corresponds to plannedness, darkness, death and discreteness. For the remaining two dimensions, it is useful to keep in mind the English word 'thesis' ('a statement or theory put forward as a premise to be maintained or proved').
Following the metatheoretical lines of consciousness as presented by Mamardashvili and Pyatigorskij (2011) , I argue that all and each consciousness is situated in the sphere of consciousness, which possesses neither a spatial nor a temporal defi nition; it is 'where' each consciousness is situated pragmatically, yet not statically. It is the state(s) of consciousness in which there is a correspondence for each notional construct with the subject's given psychic state as a structure or content of consciousness. States of consciousness are in themselves empty, though not as the opposition of form and content; a state of consciousness is not the antithesis of content in relation to it. Th at is, absence of thought does not entail absence of consciousness, which can exist without conscious thought.
Th at said, the semiotic activity and volition of human consciousness with regard to cognition, 'A' along with its constituent parts facilitate the sphere of conscious thought and acknowledged existence and may be said to be egeirothetic 15 . Th at is, consciousness is in an awake state that facilitates the structure 'I' and what follows, thus being capable of action at will. In the strict sense, all information from both culture (C) and nature (N) as well as from dream (Z) fall under this semiosic category as objects of knowledge. Instead of existing in the noumenal world of Ding an sich's, we know of them and of everything else only through signs or through our memories of them, which, of course, are also signs, hence the absence of a specifi c function to this dimension. From the 45 o tilted point of view of being-able-to-do, it may be argued however that to an extent, the functional potential in egeirothetic semiosis as conscious thought and action by volition is restricted according to the value of the modal category being-able-to-do, i.e. semiosis is in a position of freedom due to the presence of 'sign-ness' in its totality. Everything there is to know can be known to the extent that signs can be known.
Th e also familiar lower-half 'Z' and its parts facilitate dreaming and unconscious thought in the sphere of consciousness and may be said to be oneirothetic 16 . Th ough dreaming occurs in the sphere of consciousness, the 'I' dreamt therein does not facilitate an identical 'I' to that of the mundane awake as a state, structure nor fact or content of consciousness. Granted, sometimes there is some degree of awareness or sense of self in a dream but in general it may be said that whilst dreaming, 'I' am not aware that I am dreaming. Indeed, only in reality do we suspect whether it is actual. 'I' is as is the dream -unreal. A dreamer cannot decide the content of dreams nor am 'I' able to stop thoughts from appearing or the mind from wandering. 17 As regards dreams, the gist of the matter is that the majority of representations or knowledge of them in this dimension become known to us only in retrospect. In general, reminiscing can take place only aft erwards. It is categorically impossible to indulge oneself in the recollection of past events when they have not yet come to pass, or in the case of dreams, not yet ended. A dream is a memory in both senses of the word. As was pointed out, we 'know dreams from our memory of them aft er we are awake, ' and also -excluding lucid dreaming -'I' either does not exist as a mental construct or to say the least, it is wholly diff erent by way of being in accordance with the Traumwelt, rather than the mundane reality. Were there reminiscing in a dream, it is part of the dream itself, in the 'present' of the Traumwelt that -in a sense -has nothing to do with reality. Dreams are not 'real' in the sense that they would exist so to say nor do they necessarily have an equivalent in reality; they are just dreams. And yet, as is known, dreams do serve a purpose in our existence, as for example strengthening and/or weakening memory and by this working through the whole 'I' and forming it in the process. From the 45 o tilted point of view of being-able-to-do, it may be argued that to an extent, the functional potential of 'sign-ness' in oneirothetic semiosis is restricted according to the value of the modal category not-being-able-to-do, i.e. semiosis is in a position of powerlessness due to the lack of both object and interpretant, the representations of which are known to us only by memory.
Conclusion
In conclusion, mandala-vandalization of the semiotic square by placing one on top of the other has yielded a fairly wholesome picture of the quadruple dimensional nature of semiosis according to the triadic relations of 'sign-ness' in each. Th e values of modal categories restricting semiosis, its main 'states' and 'doings' in two parallel dimensions (N/C), have been brought to view and are by extension applicable to the remaining two (A/Z) to support the central argument.
Th e fi rst adaptation of the semiotic square in which the dimensions of semiosis were explicated, supports the existence and diff erence in characters of these dimensions more clearly by explicating their respective sign-relations and the nature of 'sign-ness' .
Secondly, what we perceive of the world -whether that of nature or of culturewe perceive only the manifest outcome via signs, not the latent reason or function. As was shown, thesisaorist and arsisaorist semiosis are (non-)interpretations -the 'doing' if one pleases -that defi ne and in part are the overall functional principles in their respective dimensions; nature is non-interpretative and culture is nothing but interpretation. Autophaneric and sciautomatic in their turn are the more-or-less material outcomes -'state' -that facilitate the primary functional principles in their respective dimensions as elementary semiotic mechanisms; nature as an object of submission in and to herself and culture as an independent non-object in and of itself. In their respective dimensions they correspond to the latent function and manifest form or, the unseen and seen of nature and culture. In short, thesisaorist-autophaneric semiosis is object in submission to non-interpretation, whereas arsisaorist-sciautomatic semiosis is interpretation independent of objects.
Th irdly, egeirothetic semiosis -our daily semiotic reality consisting in part of nature and in part of culture encompassing both of the above dimensions in the body and mind (where to place 'spirit' is a diff erent question) -was shown to function in full extent with regard to 'sign-ness. ' Th e relations of signs and knowledge of separable dimensions of semiosis ironically captivates the intellect into its own distinct dimension. As such, it positions dream (and dreaming) -oneirothetic semiosis -as analogous and into a similar opposition as those of nature's functional principle (N/Z) and culture's elementary mechanism (C/Z) with regard to their counterparts due to the lack of both object and interpretation. Our cognition may be argued to be based partially on dreams of which we are not aware while dreaming and partially on dreams known from memory -a 'doing' and a 'state' as understood awake.
Or, expressed in terms introduced in this article -on the basis of our bodies being natural organisms and on the analogous structure and function of the human intellect and culture -a part of our consciousness and by extension cognition is based on known dreams that are an autophaneric-arsisaorist 'state' in egeirothetic reality, and a part on dreaming as such that is a thesisaorist-sciautomatic 'doing' in oneirothetic reality and, as was proposed, they may be functionally concomitant. Th e former inevitably requires translation, because it is the result of the latter -an unknown language -and by this lifelong cycle of strengthening/weakening a mnemonic consciousness, parts of the world's meanings are put to place.
Among other things, what separates human from beast is doubt -at some point the nature of reality and the realness of natural objects therein became dubious for our species and this dubiety was based upon the primordial, hesitant interpretation of the seemingly praeternatural in its surroundings that bursted into abstract existence, into thought by way of dreams. Confronted with something uncanny in its surroundings, the archaic, nigh-animal mind had every reason to suspect s/he was in a dream -or that the dream was in reality -which led to a semiotic experiment in both dimensions.
If it is what it seems to be as in nature and as in a dream -awareness of the latter enabling the possibility for it not to be what it seems to be; it could be or the very least it can be made to be something it is not -a cultural object. In short, the transit from nature to culture, from semiosic submission to independence required development and improvement of memory achieved by way of dream and semiosic powerlessness therein which aided transforming the immediate 'stimulus-response' reaction into a sign awake; into freedom.
Th is leads to suggest that what photosynthesis is to plants or what metabolism is to animals; what continuance and unpredictability are to culture -dreams and dreaming are their equivalent to compos mentis in human beings. Th e last trait is derived from consciousness, and considering its alleged changes during our phylogenesis along with the fact that we as natural beings are a product of evolution, it may be argued that consciousness as such should not be restricted within the boundaries of human fl esh alone. Четыре возможности представления триадической «знаковости» в двух семиотических квадратах В статье рассматривается семиозис и его измерения как теоретическая конструкция, чтобы показать некоторые элементарные различия между сферами семиотического действия. По сути знак будет разделен на четыре категории существования, чтобы показать, что он может иметь разные отношения в зависимости от того, в каком измерении он находится. Основной рамкой, вместе с тем, является человеческое сознание в его двух состояниях: в состоянии бодрствования и сна со сновидениями, с акцентом на последнее. Несмотря на широкое использование универсальных понятий 'природа' и 'культура' , статья не сосредоточивается на семиотических особенностях этих доменов. С нашей точки зрения 'природа' и 'культура' имеют два уровня, т.е. проявленную форму и скрытую функцию, видимое и невидимое. Они используются параллельно, поддерживая центральный тезис этой статьи о том, что человеческое познание имеет соответствие в виде сновидения. Теоретическая рамка взята из работы Греймаса и Курте с акцентом на семиотический квадрат. Понятие знака трактуется в духе Пирса, тогда как понятие «знаковости» дается по Пятигорскому. При проекции триадического знака на семиотический квадрат и исключении понятия «знаковой системы» вместе с синтаксическим аспектом, обнаруживается основное четырехкратное измерение знака, опирающаяся на определенные знаковые отношения в каждом данном измерении. Чтобы удвоить квадрат, семиозис будет наделен функцией «быть способным», таким образом обеспечивая начальное выражение доминирующих модальностей, служащих в каждом из четырых измерений основой для структуры (структур) элементарной функции и механизма. Это также даст возможность рассмотреть некоторые элементарные ограничения семиозиса в каждом из измерений. Наконец, предлагаются некоторые новые термины в соответствии с тем, что было представлено.
Triaadilise 'märgilisuse' neli võimalust kahel semiootilisel ruudul
Artikkel tegeleb semioosi ja selle mõõtmetega kui teoreetilise konstruktsiooniga, et demonstreerida mõningaid elementaarseid erinevusi semiootilise tegevuse sfäärides. Sisuliselt lahatakse üks märk neljaks eksistentsikategooriaks, näitamaks, et sel võivad olla erinevad suhted olenevalt mõõtmest, milles see olema juhtub. Üldiseks raamiks on inimteadvus ja selle kaks eristuvat olekut: ärkvelolek ja uni, rõhuasetusega viimasel. Vaatamata universaalsete terminite nagu 'loodus' ja 'kultuur' ohtrale kasutamisele, ei tegele käesolev artikkel nende valdkondade semiootiliste eripäradega. Meie seisukohast on 'loodusel' ja 'kultuuril' kaks kihti -manifestne vorm ja latentne funktsioon, nähtav ja nähtamatu. Neid vaadeldakse paralleelselt, et toetada käesoleva artikli keskset teesi, et inimkognitsiooni vasteks on unenägemine.
Peamine teoreetiline raam tuleneb Greimase ja Courtés' töödest, rõhuasetusega semiootilisele ruudule. Märgi mõiste võetakse Peirce'ilt ning "märgilisus" Pjatigorskilt. Projitseerides triaadilist märki semiootilisele ruudule ning välistades 'märgisüsteemi' mõiste koos süntaktilise aspektiga, tuuakse nähtavale märgi neljakordne alusdimensioon, mis tugineb kindlatele märgisuhetele igas antud mõõtmes. Et ruutu kahekordistada, antakse semioosile 'suutlikkuse' jooned, lubades domineerivate modaalsuste algset väljendumist, mis igas neljast dimensioonist toimivad elementaarse funktsiooni struktuuri(de) ja mehhanismi alusena. See võimaldab vaatluse alla tuua ka mõned elementaarsed piirangud semioosile iga dimensioonis. Viimaks pakutakse välja mõned uued terminid.
